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Approved For Release 1999/09/28 : CIA-RDP85T00810R000300040004-5

TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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1 OF 1


9 JUNE 1971

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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda



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9 JUNE 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 23)

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FBIS TRENDS

9 JUNE 1971

CONTENTS

Topics and Events Given Major Attention i

INDOCHINA

PRG Second Anniversary Celebration Similar to Last Year's . . . 1
 Peking Adds Editorial Comment to PRG Anniversary Propaganda . . 4
 Moscow Marks PRG Anniversary in Standard Fashion 6
 Praise for Snuol Battle, PLAF Ambush of Returning ARVN Forces . 8
 Sihanouk Minister Named Commander-in-Chief of CNPLAF 9
 DRV, Front Score Thieu Election Maneuvers, Arrest of Deputy . . 10
 Paris Delegates, Comment Score President's Withdrawal Policy . 11
 Hanoi Silent on Abortive GVN Transfer of Prisoners to DRV . . . 13
 Pathet Lao Scores Souvanna Phouma's Reply to 12 May Proposal . 14

PRC AND ROMANIA

Ceausescu Visit Celebrates Warm Sino-Romanian Relations 16

NATO MEETING

Moscow Deplores Lack of "Concrete" Reply on Force-Cut Talks . . 22

OUTER SPACE

USSR Submits Draft Treaty on Moon for UNGA Consideration . . . 24

MIDDLE EAST

Primakov Comments Highlight 1967 War Anniversary Propaganda . . 26

USSR AND YUGOSLAVIA

Belgrade Protests "Slanders" by Emigres in Soviet Union 30

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Prague Reacts Belatedly to West German Story on Husak 32

PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Kang, Hsieh Reappear as Chen Po-Ta Absence Continues 34
 Provincial Party Committee Established in Yunnan 35
 Ministry Article Indicates New Stress on Light Industry 36

CONFIDENTIAL

9 JUNE 1971

- 1 -

TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 31 MAY - 6 JUNE 1971

<u>Moscow (3054 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1529 items)</u>		
Indochina	(3%)	8%	Indochina	(28%)	31%
[PRG Anniversary	(0.5%)	5%]	[Souphanouvong	(--)	11%]
Soviet June Elections	(5%)	8%	in DRV		
Soyuz XI Launching	(--)	5%	[PRG Anniversary	(--)	8%]
Podgorny in UAR,	(13%)	5%	[Sihanouk Tours	(3%)	3%]
Soviet-UAR Treaty			PRC		
Makarios in USSR	(--)	4%	Ceausescu in PRC	(--)	29%
Czechoslovak CP Congress	(21%)	4%	Domestic Issues	(33%)	22%
& Brezhnev Visit			Sudanese Government	(--)	2%
Middle East	(2%)	3%	Delegation in PRC		
China	(3%)	3%	Somali Government	(--)	2%
Lisbon NATO Council	(0.1%)	2%	Delegation in PRC		
Meeting					

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

9 JUNE 1971

- 1 -

INDOCHINA

The second anniversary of the 6 June 1969 formation of the South Vietnamese Provisional Revolutionary Government provides the occasion for Vietnamese communist reiterations that "victories" in both the political and military struggles have dealt severe blows to the Vietnamization policy and the Nixon Doctrine. As last year, the anniversary was marked by a meeting in a "liberated" zone in the South addressed by PRG President Huynh Tan Phat, and receptions in Hanoi, Peking and Moscow.

Vietnamese and Cambodian communist comment on military action centers on the ARVN's retreat from the Cambodian town of Snuol. There is further, more detailed comment on the 30 May battle in the Snuol area, with propagandists highlighting the significance of this "big battle of annihilation." In addition, 31 May attacks in South Vietnam's Binh Long Province on ARVN forces leaving Cambodia are hailed as a "resounding victory" dealing another serious blow to the Saigon regime.

Hanoi media have maintained silence on the 4 June abortive GVN transfer of sick and wounded North Vietnamese prisoners since the VNA authorized statement on the 3d said the stipulations on their reception outlined on 13 May by VNA were "annulled" as only 13 of the promised 570 "patriots" would be returned. A special statement on the 13 "patriots" which VNA said would be forthcoming has not been issued.

Communist media have not acknowledged that the prisoner-transfer issue was discussed at Paris on the 3d or that President Nixon was questioned about it in his press conference on the 1st. Comment pegged to the press conference, as well as the delegates' statements at Paris, continues to insist that the setting of a date for U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam is the necessary prerequisite to the settlement of such questions as prisoner repatriation.

Souvanna Phouma's 26 May letter responding to the 12 May NLHS peace "initiative" is scored in a "communique" from the NLHS Central Committee, carried by VNA as well as the Pathet Lao news agency on 8 June. The communique complains that the Premier failed to demand an end to U.S. bombing in Laos and that his "vague contentions" are not responsive to the new NLHS proposals.

PRG SECOND ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATION SIMILAR TO LAST YEAR'S

THE FRONT The second anniversary of the 6 June 1969 founding of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam reportedly was marked at a 5 June meeting in a

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
9 JUNE 1971

- 2 -

"liberated area" attended by officials of the PRG, NFLSV, and Vietnam Alliance, including PRG President Huynh Tan Phat and Defense Minister Tran Nam Trung. President Phat delivered the main address at the meeting, as he did at a similar gathering last year.

In his speech, carried textually by Liberation Radio on the 6th, Phat repeated standard claims that the fighting in Indochina this year has caused allied setbacks which have "seriously shaken" the Saigon regime and army and "destroyed the illusion of beefing up the puppets." He appealed to "compatriots and combatants" to strengthen unity around the PRG and step up the resistance, and he affirmed that the PRG is determined, no matter what the difficulties and hardships, to lead the struggle to defeat the "U.S. imperialists' aggressive war" and Vietnamization policy, to achieve an independent, democratic, peaceful, neutral, and prosperous South Vietnam, to proceed toward peacefully reunifying the country, and to cooperate with the peoples of Laos and Cambodia in driving the United States out of Indochina.

The policies of the NFLSV and PRG, according to Phat, meet the aspirations of the southern people and have been recognized as correct and reasonable by the people of the world, including "American progressives." Phat also interjected a rare reference to future relations with the United States; he observed that the NFLSV/PRG 10-point solution and eight-point elaboration "show our people's sincere desire to settle the present war situation and pave the way to peace in South Vietnam, on the basis of the guarantee for our independence and sovereignty and in the interest of the future mutual and friendly relations between our country and the United States." Point six of the 10 points and point five of the eight points advocate that a future South Vietnamese government establish relations with all countries, irrespective of their political regime, "including the United States"; but the question of future relations with the United States is not normally raised in the propaganda.

Nguyen Huu Tho, NFLSV chairman and president of the PRG's Advisory Council, as last year, was not listed as attending the anniversary meeting. However, Hanoi and Front media on the 6th publicized an anniversary interview Tho granted to a Polish correspondent. Tho routinely claims that the PRG is the authentic and legal representative of the South Vietnamese people and, among other things, cites its recognition by 27 countries. In fact, only 25 countries are known to have

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS

9 JUNE 1971

- 3 -

recognized the PRG and other Vietnamese propaganda on the anniversary only remarks more generally that the prestige of the PRG is rising in the international community and that it is recognized by nearly 30 nations.

A claim that 27 countries have recognized the PRG or "stated that they wish to establish diplomatic relations with it" was made by PRG Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh in an interview published in the Bulgarian paper OTECHESTVEN FRONT on 6 June. But Mme. Binh went on, somewhat contradictorily, to list 27 countries which have allegedly "recognized" the PRG, including Guinea and Somalia.

BACKGROUND: Neither Guinea nor Somalia is known to have actually recognized the PRG. A South Vietnamese communist publication, VIETNAM STUDIES, in a list of countries dated 31 January 1970, also claimed that Guinea had recognized the PRG and established relations at ambassadorial level on 5 December 1969; however, the DRV army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN omitted Guinea in a report on recognition of the PRG published on 20 December 1970.

In addition to 12 communist countries* and the nonaligned Yugoslavs, the PRG has been recognized by Algeria, Syria, Congo (B), Cambodia (Sihanouk's government), South Yemen, the UAR, Mauritania, Sudan, Mali, Iraq, Tanzania, and Ceylon. All these states recognized the PRG promptly in June or July 1969 except for Tanzania, which extended recognition in January 1970, and Ceylon, in July 1970.

HANOI North Vietnam marked the PRG anniversary with a reception on 4 June attended by DRV leaders including Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, and Vo Nguyen Giap. The reception was given by acting head of the PRG representation in Hanoi, Nguyen Phu Soai, who spoke at the gathering. A similar reception was held on 8 June last year and Le Duan, as well as Truong Chinh, was among the guests. As last year, the DRV sent a congratulatory message to Nguyen Huu Tho and Huynh Tan Phat, signed by Ton Duc Thang, Truong Chinh, and Pham Van Dong.

* The DRV took note of the establishment of the provisional government in the South by promptly on 12 June 1969 raising the NFLSV representation in the North to the status of "special representation" of the Republic of South Vietnam.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
9 JUNE 1971

- 4 -

Alleged achievements of the PRG were hailed in editorials in the party organ NHAN DAN and the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 6 June, the latter praising military feats in the South in the past two years which it said have "severely defeated" Vietnamization. The army paper also repeats the standard line that the balance of forces on the battlefield is moving against the "Nixon clique" and the expansion of the war throughout Indochina has scattered allied forces and driven them into a passive strategic posture.

The NHAN DAN editorial, in acclaiming the alleged expansion of the "liberated area," specifically claimed that "revolutionary power" has been established in 44 provinces, six cities, 182 districts, and more than 1,500 villages. Last year anniversary propaganda variously claimed "revolutionary power" had been set up in 42 or 44 provinces and cities, as well as in over 150 districts, townships, or townlets, and in 1,500 villages.

PEKING ADDS EDITORIAL COMMENT TO PRG ANNIVERSARY PROPAGANDA

Chou En-lai's message to Nguyen Huu Tho and Huynh Tan Phat* highlights Peking's observance of the PRG's second anniversary, which was also celebrated in Peking with a reception given by Chinese friendship associations on 4 June and a PRG embassy reception the next day. Unlike last year, there is also a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, dated the 6th.

Praising the victories of the PRG-led South Vietnamese people during the past two years and "particularly since the beginning of this year"--the battles of Highway 9 and Khe Sanh are specifically cited--Chou's message, carried by NCNA on 5 June, claims that those victories have "greatly inspired and promoted" the "revolutionary mass movement within the United States" and asserts that "the Nixon government is in a most awkward dilemma." Declaring that "victory surely belongs to the Vietnamese and other Indochinese peoples," the message characterizes the Chinese and Vietnamese peoples as "close comrades-in-arms and brothers who are united together and fighting together" and promises that "the Chinese people will give all-out support and assistance to the Vietnamese people in their war against U.S.

* Chou's message of congratulations and recognition in 1969 and his anniversary message last year were addressed only to Phat.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

9 JUNE 1971

- 5 -

aggression and for national salvation until complete victory." In slightly different language, Chou's message last year had assured the Vietnamese that the Chinese people would give them "firm support" until "all the U.S. aggressors are driven out of Vietnamese soil."

The PRC speaker at the PRG embassy reception, Chief of the General Staff of the PLA Huang Yung-sheng,* indulged in the usual rhetoric about PRG military victories, the growth of "liberated areas," enhanced PRG international prestige, and the coordinated battle plans of the three Indochinese peoples. Declaring that U.S. policy has "completely failed," Huang said that while "talking glibly about 'ending' the war" the United States has "refused to accept the reasonable stand for the complete and unconditional withdrawal of U.S. aggressor troops from Indochina within a set time limit." Although the host at the reception, PRG Ambassador Nguyen Van Quang, had urged U.S. acceptance of the NFLSV/PRG 10-point solution and eight-point elaboration, Huang did not mention these proposals. However, the PRC-Romanian communique, issued on 9 June at the end of Ceausescu's visit, states that both sides support a Vietnam settlement "on the basis of the '10-point overall solution' and 'eight-point clarifications'" of the NFLSV and the PRG. The communique also declares the two sides' support for the Lao Patriotic Front's "five-point political solution" of 6 March 1970 and for Sihanouk's "just stand" as expressed in his five-point statement of 23 March 1970.

On the issue of Chinese support, Huang echoed Chou's message in pledging "all-out support and assistance" to the Indochinese peoples "until complete victory." In addition, he restated the Mao "instruction," introduced by Chou En-lai in his 6 March Hanoi rally speech and repeated in a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on 11 March, which declares: "If anyone among us should say that we should not help the Vietnamese people in their struggle against U.S. aggression and for national salvation, that will be betrayal, betrayal of the revolution." NCNA singled out this injunction of Huang's speech in the course of a 5 June report on the reception.

* Li Hsien-nien was the PRC spokesman at last year's PRG embassy reception, which was also attended by Chou. Chou was on a provincial tour with Ceausescu at the time of the reception this year.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
9 JUNE 1971

- 6 -

The 6 June PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial differs little in substance from Chou's message and Huang's speech. Besides hailing the exploits of the Vietnamese people, it claims that the Highway 9 victory "intensified the internal contradictions in the U.S. ruling circles and stimulated a new upsurge in the revolutionary mass movement of the American people in opposing aggressive war." It declares that "the whole area of Indochina is in an excellent revolutionary situation," and it echoes Huang's reference to U.S. refusal to "accept the reasonable suggestion that the U.S. aggressive troops be withdrawn from Indochina totally, unconditionally, and within a certain time limit." It reiterates that the Chinese people "are determined to go all-out" to support the Vietnamese and other Indochinese peoples "until they achieve complete victory."

Other Peking events celebrating the anniversary included a 4 June reception given jointly by the China-Vietnam Friendship Association and the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries; the showing of two Vietnamese films, one of them a documentary entitled "Brilliant Victories on Highway 9"; and a photographic exhibit sponsored by the two friendship associations. Both Li Hsien-nien and Kuo Mo-jo attended the reception of the friendship associations; Kuo Mo-jo remarked in a speech that the situation in Indochina "is excellent, better than ever before."

MOSCOW MARKS PRG ANNIVERSARY IN STANDARD FASHION

Moscow marked the second anniversary of the PRG much as it did last year, and the content of the propaganda is routine. There was a congratulatory message from Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin addressed to Nguyen Huu Tho and Huynh Tan Phat. A public meeting was held in Moscow on 1 June, addressed this year by Lev Smirnov, deputy chairman of the Soviet Committee to Support Vietnam and Chairman of the RFSFR Supreme Court. The PRG Ambassador's 2 June reception was attended by CPSU Politburo member Viktor Grishin, who also attended the reception last year when he was a candidate member.

The Soviet leaders' message praises the military victories of the South Vietnamese "patriots" over the past two years and the growth in international prestige of the PRG. It also expresses confidence that the U.S. policies of Vietnamization and "extended aggression" will be defeated. There is routine praise for

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
9 JUNE 1971

- 7 -

military "victories" in the face of U.S. efforts at Vietnamization; TASS commentator Kharkov said on 1 June that the fighting by the NLF/SLV armed forces is being "increasingly coordinated" with combat operations of the "patriotic forces" of Laos and Cambodia in a "single front of anti-imperialist struggle."

Commentators also laud the social and economic development in the "liberated areas" and contrast growing PRG international prestige with the allegedly weakening position of the Saigon "puppets." Aleksey Leontyev, in an English-language broadcast on 5 June, chided the United States for persisting in support for a Saigon regime that has "no chance of surviving." Even in cities "fully controlled by the Americans and Saigonese," such as Saigon, Danang, Hue, and a "few others," Leontyev said, there are functioning branches of the "popular front fighting for peace" which stage protests against the regime. Other commentaries similarly point to efforts to overthrow the "puppet regime" by "millions" of students, intellectuals, and members of religious groups and to the establishment of "revolutionary power" and new mass organizations throughout the country.

The political settlement issue was broached by Smirnov at the rally when he briefly praised the PRG's "sincere striving for a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam conflict." And some of the routine comment specifically praises the PRG's 10-point program and eight-point elaboration.

SOVIET ASSISTANCE,
LE THANH NGHI VISIT

Propaganda surrounding the PRG anniversary gave largely pro forma attention to Soviet aid and support to the Vietnamese and other

Indochinese peoples. The leaders' message merely refers to "consistent and firm support," although Grishin at the reception asserted that the Vietnamese "patriots" know well what "real aid and moral and political support" the USSR gives them.

At a time, however, when the propaganda was giving only routine attention to assistance, DRV deputy premier Le Thanh Nghi reportedly met with Soviet Deputy Premier Novikov on 1 June to discuss "questions of further developing USSR-DRV economic cooperation." Le Thanh Nghi, who usually leads the DRV's economic delegations which annually tour the communist countries to sign aid agreements, had been in Prague attending the Czechoslovak party congress. Both TASS and VNA reported that he met with Novikov again on the 4th, when they discussed "questions of Soviet-Vietnamese relations and some other important questions of mutual interest." There is no available report of Nghi's departure from Moscow, but on 7 June VNA reported that he left Hanoi for the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
9 JUNE 1971

- 8 -

PRAISE FOR SNUOL BATTLE, P' AF AMBUSH OF RETURNING ARVN FORCES

Vietnamese communist comment on the ARVN's 30 May retreat from Snuol continues to praise the allegedly unprecedented success of the Cambodian liberation army (CNPLAF) in fighting there. And some propaganda maintains that the Snuol "victory," coming in the wake of ARVN losses in southern Laos, demonstrated the inevitability of the collapse of the Saigon army.*

Several commentaries note that the victory was achieved despite the fact that the location of the Snuol battle favored the ARVN--because of the terrain and the area's proximity to South Vietnam. A commentary in the 4 June QUAN DOI NHAN DAN stressed this point in ridiculing allied statements explaining ARVN difficulties in the Lam Son 719 operation in southern Laos. The commentary observed that the allies tried to "justify their defeats" in Laos by claiming that the terrain was rugged, that "the liberation forces in the area were fully equipped and had units of all armed branches at their disposal," and that therefore the "liberation troops" could "engage in large-scale combat in the daytime." It added that the allies also contended that on other battlefields the adversary could not cause such defeats or engage in large-scale combat. In fact, the commentary argued, the forces in Snuol fought "a big battle of annihilation" despite the fact that they "did not have tanks and did not have many antiaircraft guns of various types and despite the fact that the terrain in Snuol is not rugged."

The propaganda's description of the Snuol battle as a "big battle of annihilation" is similar to the characterization of the fighting in southern Laos earlier this year. Some comment on Lam Son 719 generalized on the importance of such major battles, and an article in the 2 April QUAN DOI NHAN DAN by military commentator "Chien Binh" (combatant) argued that the allies could not cope with "large-scale blows of annihilation" and noted that South Vietnam, like Laos and Cambodia, had topography suitable for such battles.**

* Initial communist propaganda on the Snuol fighting is reviewed in the 3 June TRENDS, pages 6-8.

** The 2 April Chien Binh article is discussed in the 7 April TRENDS, pages 1-3.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

9 JUNE 1971

- 9 -

Liberation Radio comment on the Snuol fighting included a 5 June broadcast of an editorial from the PLAF organ QUAN GIAI PHONG, which lauded the CNPLAF for "completely smashing" the ARVN's "dry-season schemes" in northeastern Cambodia and said that the ARVN had failed in its schemes to "loot supply depots, interdict the supply movement of the Cambodian armed forces and people, and support the Phnom Penh puppet troops to nibble at the liberated area." It added that the South Vietnamese forces have been completely driven out of Kratie Province, where Snuol is located, and that the province is now "completely liberated." Asserting that the allies have sustained serious losses in Laos and South Vietnam as well as in Cambodia, the editorial observed that "it becomes more and more clear that a series of great victories will be won on these battlefields."

**BINH LONG
AMBUSH** A 31 May ambush of ARVN forces leaving Cambodia on Highway 13 was reported by LPA on the 4th in an item which claimed that the South Vietnamese liberation forces (PLAF) "wiped out" the 3d battalion of the ARVN 9th Regiment, 5th Division, and "chopped up" the 4th battalion of the same regiment. Comment on the alleged feat included a 5 June QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article which said the battalions were part of a key force on Highway 13 supporting ARVN forces in Snuol. According to the army paper, after the "annihilation" of ARVN forces in Snuol on 30 May the troops in the two battalions "were so scared that they hastened to return to South Vietnam. But as soon as they arrived at the border area, they were badly hit by the Binh Long combatants." A Hanoi radio commentary on the Binh Long fighting, broadcast in Vietnamese to South Vietnam on the 5th, hailed the alleged achievements of the liberation armed forces in Cambodia and South Vietnam in the two days of fighting--30 and 31 May. It claimed that a total of 11 ARVN infantry, artillery, and armored battalions had been put out of action and that as a result the ARVN 5th Division had lost more than half of its organic infantry battalions.

SIHANOUK MINISTER NAMED COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF CNPLAF

On 3 June the Cambodian Information Agency reported a telegram from Sihanouk's RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth to Khieu Samphan informing him of his appointment as commander-in-chief of the Cambodian National Peoples Liberation Armed Forces (CNPLAF), a post in which he is to serve concurrently with his other functions.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
9 JUNE 1971

- 10 -

Khieu Samphan, one of the RGNU ministers said to be leading the fight in the "liberated zone," was minister of national defense in the RGNU when the new government was announced on 5 May 1970. At a FUNK Central Committee meeting in August 1970, which approved proposals on "the enlargement of the responsibilities of the leaders of internal resistance," he was given the additional post of deputy prime minister.

DRV, FRONT SCORE THIEU ELECTION MANEUVERS, ARREST OF DEPUTY

Hanoi and Front media predictably exploit the recent debate in Saigon over the election law sponsored by President Thieu--enacted by the National Assembly on 3 June--and the criticism of Thieu's regime for the 31 May arrest of Ngo Cong Duc, a National Assembly deputy and publisher of the anti-administration daily TIN SANG. Both the election law--which includes the proviso that any presidential candidate must be endorsed by either 40 National Assembly members or 100 members of the provincial councils--and the arrest of the deputy are viewed as moves by Thieu to assure his victory in the October presidential election. Vietnamese communist comment continues routinely to denounce the elections as a "farce" aimed at maintaining the "puppet" regime in power.

While Vice President Ky as a possible presidential candidate has been attacked along with Thieu, Hanoi and the Front continue to be circumspect in their treatment of Duong Van Minh, the other potential candidate. Minh is currently mentioned in Vietnamese communist radio and news agency reports of press speculation that the election law will hurt his chances of becoming a candidate, and a 3 June VNA account of press reaction to Ngo Cong Duc's arrest notes that Duc was associated with a group supporting Minh. Minh's criticism of the election law as "unconstitutional" was quoted in a 7 June LPA report on a gathering of opponents of the Thieu regime on the 5th; the report noted that the group included Deputy Ngo Cong Duc, Ngo Ba Thanh of the Women's Committee for the Right to Live, the An Quang Buddhist Institution's General Secretary Thich Thien Hoe, and lawyer Tran Van Tuyen. It observes that only Minh was allowed by police to enter the house of lawyer Tran Ngoc Lieng for the meeting. The LPA report was not carried in monitored Hanoi or Front broadcasts in Vietnamese.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

9 JUNE 1971

- 11 -

PARIS DELEGATES, COMMENT SCORE PRESIDENT'S WITHDRAWAL POLICY

The President is assailed for again, at his 1 June TV press conference, "refusing" to set a deadline for a total U.S. and allied troop withdrawal from South Vietnam so that prisoner release and other questions can be discussed. The usual statements were promptly issued in Paris by the DRV and PRG spokesmen, and both PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh and DRV delegate Xuan Thuy voiced typically critical remarks at the session on the 3d. But otherwise there is only limited, routine comment from Hanoi and Liberation Radio, from VNA and LPA, and from NHAN DAN.

The most substantial comment came in a Hanoi radio commentary on the 3d. It indirectly acknowledged much of the content of the press conference, though it obscured the context and some of the details of the exchanges with reporters. Thus, it said that while he again promised to bring the troops home, the President still refused to set a deadline, and that under the pretext of preventing the communists from seizing power in South Vietnam, he showed his intention of resorting to all means to "cling to the Thieu-Ky clique." The commentary said the President was "embarrassed" when reporters told him that relatives of the prisoners were denouncing his policy. It also noted some of the exchanges on last month's antiwar demonstrations in Washington.

The VNA account of the 3 June Paris session notes that PRG representative Mme. Binh denounced the President for refusing to set a reasonable timelimit for a quick U.S. troop withdrawal and for instead "putting forth absurd conditions" for a withdrawal. But VNA does not report her remark that he made "slandorous" statements about the Vietnamese people's treatment of prisoners. Oddly, VNA fails to acknowledge that Xuan Thuy similarly denounced the President's troop-withdrawal stance and argued that it is the United States that is delaying a settlement of the POW question.

OPPOSITION TO THE WAR The comment on the press conference puts some stress on growing opposition in the United States to the President's policy. The 3 June Hanoi radio broadcast said the reporters noted that public opinion opposed the war because of its "immoral character" and

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
9 JUNE 1971

- 12 -

that the antiwar demonstrators denounced U.S. "war crimes" in Indochina "not only because many U.S. troops did massacre the civilian people, but also because there had been many wanton acts of bombing ordered by the U.S. Administration."

A 4 June LPA commentary described the President as "greatly disconcerted by the journalists' barrage of questions" on U.S. public opinion. Hanoi radio said the President "had to admit his state of increased isolation when the journalists hinted at the two recent polls which demonstrate that the American people have lost their confidence in Nixon." VNA on the 3d also said that the President "cannot help being jittery" at the many questions fired at him regarding the problems of Vietnam and Indochina; he had to acknowledge, VNA added, that the American people are tired of the war and that there is a lack of credibility in the policy of his administration. A brief VNA account cited a NHAN DAN article as warning that the "credibility gap" has "become a potent threat" to the President's career, since "his ratings are much lower than his predecessor's."

The comment takes no notice of the President's exchanges with reporters on the legality of the arrests during the antiwar demonstrations in early May. But the Hanoi radio broadcast on the 3d mentioned the President's affirmation of his support for the police and remarked that his answer to the "American people's seething movement to oppose the war" was "repression." The 4 June LPA commentary said the President "tried hard to justify his fascist acts" against the demonstrators, "slandering them as "vandals and hoodlums and law breakers."

Both Hanoi radio and VNA on the 4th cited press reports that "the leaders of various antiwar organizations" held a press conference on the 2d to "vehemently object to Nixon's stubborn warlike stand as expressed in his 1 June press conference and his insolent critical words addressed to the Americans who have participated in the spring struggle." They noted that the leaders of the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice said they would meet in Milwaukee at the end of June to work out plans for further antiwar actions in Autumn. VNA reported on the 5th that the Lawyers against the War announced its intention to organize antiwar demonstrations "in reply to the threats the President made in his press conference against the antiwar movement."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
TRENDS
9 JUNE 1971

- 13 -

HANOI SILENT ON ABORTIVE GVN TRANSFER OF PRISONERS TO DRV

The GVN attempt to release 13 North Vietnamese prisoners of war on 4 June has been unmentioned in Hanoi media since the 3d, when VNA's "authorized" statement "annulled" the procedures for the reception of 570 sick and wounded "patriots" that had been outlined in a VNA statement of 13 May.*

In line with their general practice of not reporting the press briefings that follow the Paris sessions, communist media ignored the briefing on 3 June and hence did not acknowledge that the prisoner issue was discussed there. DRV spokesman Nguyen Thanh Le charged in his press briefing that the United States and Saigon had "invented the farce of the release of 570 patriots." Harking back to the GVN release of 37 "patriots" across the DMZ on 24 January, he said that at that time "the U.S.-puppets introduced more than 20 M-113 armored vehicles into the DMZ to strengthen their military forces there."** And he added the new charge that "this was a step for the U.S.-puppets to launch their military operation against southern Laos." Le cast doubt on the integrity of the International Red Cross by saying that it visited a number of prisons in South Vietnam without ever knowing about the infamous tiger cages on Con Son. When a reporter asked whether the DRV would receive the 13 prisoners, Le told him to await a new VNA statement.

While Hanoi comment on the President's 1 June press conference mentioned some of the questions regarding prisoners, it contained no acknowledgment that he was asked about the projected GVN transfer of prisoners to the DRV. (The President expressed hope that the refusal of all but a handful of the North Vietnamese prisoners to be returned would not deter the North Vietnamese from at least considering some kind of action in regard to sick and disabled prisoners.)

* See the 3 June TRENDS, pages 5-6.

** See the 27 January TRENDS, pages 11-12, for Hanoi comment on that prisoner release.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
9 JUNE 1971

- 14 -

PATHET LAO SCORES SOUVANNA PHOUMA'S REPLY TO 12 MAY PROPOSAL

The first known acknowledgment in communist media that Souvanna Phouma on 26 May responded to the NLHS peace initiative of the 12th--calling for a U.S. bombing halt to be followed by a cease-fire and talks on a coalition government--came on 6 June in a Pathet Lao radio "weekly conversation." The broadcast glossed over the substance of Souvanna Phouma's letter, merely criticizing his "stubborn attitude" and saying that he had advanced a seven-point proposal which just "repeated old words."*

A Pathet Lao radio commentary on the 7th did complain that Souvanna Phouma ignored the demand for an end to U.S. bombing when he called for discussions "without delay" and negotiations "without limit."

Explicit criticism of the letter is registered officially in a "communique" from the NLHS Central Committee "office" carried by both the Pathet Lao news agency and VNA on 8 June. The communique says that Souvanna Phouma, "under pressure" from the "U.S. imperialists" and their "puppet extremists," "beats around the bush" and fails to demand an end to U.S. bombing. It complains that his 26 May reply to Souphanouvong amounted to "vague contentions not responding to the new proposals of the NLHS," while at the same time the United States continues the "genocidal bombings" and the "puppet extremists" are trying to "slander and distort" the new proposals with the aim of blocking a Lao settlement.

The initial broadcast on 6 June as well as the commentary of the 7th are notable for unusual references to circles in Vientiane which "approve" the new NLHS initiative. But while picturing elements who allegedly are more forthcoming on negotiations than Souvanna Phouma, the propaganda at the same time again moderates its criticism of the premier by describing him as being pressured not only by the United States but by "reactionaries" in Vientiane.

A participant in the broadcast conversation of the 6th said that although Souvanna Phouma had delivered new proposals to Souphanouvong in order to "counter unfavorable public opinion,"

* Souvanna Phouma's letter avoided the substance of the NLHS proposals and mentioned neither the U.S. bombing nor the DRV presence; the premier instead called for "immediate serious discussions" on "all problems which are regarded as suitable for consideration."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

9 JUNE 1971

- 15 -

people in Vientiane are nevertheless criticizing Souvanna Phouma and the "ultrarightists" for rejecting the NLHS initiative and putting forward a "worthless" proposal. The panelists asserted that people in Vientiane "approve" the new NLHS initiative and believe "there is no reason to negotiate if the United States does not halt its bombing of Lao territory." Even "some representatives of the Vientiane puppet assembly" criticize Souvanna Phouma, who is "now under strong pressure from the United States and the Phouei Sananikone clique," according to the broadcast.

The commentary on the 7th said that a week after his 12 May call on Souvanna Phouma to deliver Souphanouvong's message containing the NLHS initiative, Tiao Souk Vongsak met with "Vientiane residents, including many government officials and students," who expressed approval of the NLHS proposal. The people agreed that Souvanna Phouma "does not want to negotiate a peace" because he is being "pressured" by the United States and its "ultrarightist flunkies," the commentary said, but they felt that if he could get out from under this pressure he would accept the NLHS proposals.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
9 JUNE 1971

- 16 -

PRC AND ROMANIA

CEAUSESCU VISIT CELEBRATES WARM SINO-ROMANIAN RELATIONS

The 1-9 June visit to the PRC of the Romanian party-government delegation headed by party chief Ceausescu served as a celebration of Sino-Romanian unity, offering testimony to Bucharest's broadly based international relations and to the importance Peking attaches to Romania in its East Europe policy and its opposition to the two superpowers. The visit caps a period of evolution toward close Sino-Romanian relations that was given an important impetus by the invasion of Czechoslovakia, an event prompting an immediate avowal of Chinese support for the Romanians that found new expressions during Ceausescu's visit. The Chinese announced their acceptance of an invitation to reciprocate the visit with a party-government delegation at a time to be decided later. The Romanians departed for Pyongyang on the 9th for the second leg of an Asian tour that will also include the DRV and the MPR.

The Romanians were accorded several distinguishing favors, including a rare publicized greetings by Mao when he received the delegation on the 3d. In another mark of special attention, for the first time in several years Chou En-lai--who served as the principal host--accompanied the visitors on a provincial tour that took them to Nanking and Shanghai. In addition, Peking took the occasion of the Romanian visit to resurface two Politburo members, Kang Sheng and Hsieh Fu-chih, who had been absent from public notice for several months. The two made only protocol appearances, however, and Politburo Standing Committee member Chen Po-ta's continued absence was made the more conspicuous.*

There were signs during the visit that the Chinese felt constrained to justify the upheavals of the cultural revolution, a fact which would seem related to the carefully staged manner in which they put Kang and Hsieh on display. In an unusual move, recorded in the communique released on the 9th, the Chinese "gave an account of the history of the struggle between the two lines" within the CCP and of "the importance and necessity" of the cultural revolution. For their part, the Romanians offered no praise of the cultural revolution, and when Ceausescu mentioned it he did so in a manner that was hardly flattering.

* See the PRC Internal Affairs section of this TRENDS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

9 JUNE 1971

- 17 -

Lauding Chinese achievements in a Peking rally speech on the 8th, he remarked that these achievements are the more important in that they were made in a complicated international environment and under "the special conditions of carrying out the struggle" of the cultural revolution at home.

Both sides made it clear, however, that their relations are good on both party and state levels, declaring that these relations are based on "Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism." Peking reaffirmed the endorsement, conveyed in its recent message on the Romanian party's 50th anniversary, that the Romanians are "building socialism." What underlies this endorsement was reflected in a 1 June PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the visit that hailed the Romanians for "building socialism independently." For his part, Ceausescu characteristically stressed the importance of each party charting its own course and adapting its policies to local conditions, for which he gave Mao due credit. He also took the occasion to declare that in present conditions the existence of a center of the communist movement is "neither necessary nor possible."

At the same time, Ceausescu evinced Romanian reservations about Maoist doctrine, calling for the Chinese to continue to develop under the leadership of the CCP and "under the banner of Marxism-Leninism." While it would not be expected that the Romanians would echo their hosts' invocation of "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought," other independent-minded parties sympathetic to the Chinese--such as the North Vietnamese--find themselves able to credit Chinese inspiration to "Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tsetung Thought."

TALKS The Romanian delegation, which included the ailing Premier Maurer,* conducted a series of formal talks culminating in the signing of the joint communique on the 9th. The Chinese delegation consisted of Chou; Politburo member and PLA Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng; Politburo member Yao Wen-yuan; Politburo member and Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien; Politburo member Chiu Hui-tso, the PLA logistics chief, who took part in the negotiations that produced a Chinese aid agreement with the Romanians; Keng Piao, head of the CCP's international liaison department; the acting foreign minister, Chi Peng-fei; the Chinese aid minister and a deputy foreign trade minister, and lesser officials.

* Maurer remained in Peking while the delegation visited the provinces. A photograph disseminated by NCNA showed him walking with the aid of a cane.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
9 JUNE 1971

- 18 -

According to the communique, the talks were held in an atmosphere of "cordiality, friendship, and mutual understanding," a formula indicating a substantial convergence of views falling short of unanimity. This was also indicated by Ceausescu in his 8 June Peking rally speech. After noting that the talks were "successfully" concluded and referring to the communique, he remarked that the two sides' views are "identical or close" on "fundamental questions" regarding revolution and anti-imperialism. During the course of the visit different views were reflected in divergent formulations, omissions, and interpretations, but an effort was clearly made in the communique to find the widest area of agreement possible.

Tough negotiating issues complicating this process might have caused a delay in holding the 8 June rally, which was followed by a farewell banquet that evening. NCNA reported that the talks were successfully concluded that day, fixing the time of their conclusion prior to the rally in view of Ceausescu's remarks on the communique in his rally speech. The Peking domestic radio had begun playing music that day at 0700 GMT, at a time when it is normally off the air. Less than an hour later the announcer said 10,000 people had gathered at the Great Hall of the People to welcome the Romanians and that there would be live radio and television coverage of the rally. There followed two more hours of uninterrupted music, at which time the announcer again set the scene of a waiting crowd and then the music was resumed. Finally, at 1045 GMT, the announcer reported that the rally had begun (NCNA's account said the Romanians had arrived at the hall at 1030 GMT--1830 Peking time).

MAO QUOTATION Directly quoting Mao's remarks to a visitor for the first time in recent years, Peking on the 3d quoted him as saying to the Romanians when he met them that day: "Greetings to you, comrades. May you do even better! Unite and overthrow imperialism and all reactionaries." Though the generalized reference to imperialism left the target ambiguous, the two sides subsequently interpreted Mao's exhortation--and other formulations regarding imperialism and reactionaries--in divergent ways reflecting different interests. This was demonstrated on the one occasion on which both sides cited Mao's remark, at a 6 June banquet welcoming Ceausescu to the Shanghai bailiwick of Politburo member Chang Chun-chiao (who, along with Chou, accompanied the delegation on its provincial tour):

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

9 JUNE 1971

- 19 -

+ Quoting Mao's remark, Chang said the people of Shanghai will follow Mao's instruction and unite more closely with the Romanians, "who are at the European forefront of struggle against big-power interference and aggression." Chang's interpretation of Sino-Romanian unity thus contained an anti-Soviet thrust consistent with Mao's open-ended reference to imperialism--applicable either to the U.S. variety or to that of Soviet "social imperialism"--as well as with Peking's line opposing the "superpowers."

+ Speaking on the same occasion, Ceausescu prefaced his citation of Mao's remark with the assertion that in present conditions "it is necessary more than ever to pool our forces in the struggle against imperialism." In the context of his calls in Peking for an end to strife in the communist movement, the Romanian leader's treatment of Mao's exhortation seemed contrived to turn it into a call for communist unity. That Peking so interpreted his intention seemed indicated by NCNA's deletion of this passage in its account of his Shanghai speech, thereby passing up an opportunity to cite the guest's reference to a rare remark by the Chairman. In his first major speech, in Peking on 1 June, Ceausescu had made a pitch for communist unity, stressing its importance for "the anti-imperialist front" and suggesting a Romanian role in mediating fraternal discord. It is noteworthy that Ceausescu described the campaign for communist unity as being aimed against "imperialism and reactionaries"--the targets named in Mao's deliberately ambiguous remark.

Formulations regarding "imperialism and reactionaries" appear in the communique both in an open-ended context and in a direct reference to the United States. In a passage on Sino-Romanian friendship, the communique speaks of a common struggle "against imperialism and reactionaries and against power politics"--a formulation smacking of Peking's line of opposition to the two superpowers. In another passage, opening the section on the present international situation, the communique cites the two sides' belief that the situation is increasingly unfavorable to "U.S. imperialism and all reactionaries." Having said as much, however, the communique attacks the United States directly only on the Indochina conflict, a restraint reflecting the approach taken by Ceausescu throughout his stay.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
9 JUNE 1971

- 20 -

RELATIONS WITH
SUPERPOWERS

Peking addressed itself to the triangular relationship with Moscow and Washington by pressing its line on the "superpowers" and attacking "big-power chauvinism," while avoiding the more provocative anti-Soviet terms like "social imperialism" and "modern revisionism." The Romanians went some distance in meeting the Chinese line, particularly in joining with their hosts in noting in the communique that "more and more medium and small countries" are uniting "to oppose the imperialist power politics."

The most sharply anti-Soviet remarks were made by Chou in his speech at the Romanians' farewell banquet on the 8th. Chou observed that "certain people" vilify the line of independence as nationalism while "their own acts and deeds . . . are indeed those of out-and-out national egoism and big-power chauvinism." Earlier, in his rally speech that day, Chou praised the Romanians for withstanding pressures and for having strengthened their defense capabilities at a time "when their motherland was confronted with the serious menace of imperialist interference." This passage harkened back to the time of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, when Chou had warned that the Romanians were threatened by the Soviets and expressed Chinese backing.

In his rally speech, Chou took a tough line on conciliatory overtures by the PRC's major rivals, without making clear which side he had particularly in mind. After pointing out that the Chinese are "on the alert and in full battle array" to repel "possible imperialist armed invasions," he claimed that "the imperialists" are alternately resorting to threats and black-mail on the one hand and to "high-sounding words" on the other. He warned that "we must always keep a clear head about the imperialists, neither fearing their bluster, nor easily believing their 'nice words.'"

Chou could have been reacting to Romanian mediatory efforts in either a Sino-Soviet or a Sino-U.S. context, or both. Romanian professions of a desire to overcome differences in the communist movement recurred during Ceausescu's visit, but there was no passage in the joint communique registering this desire--presumably because of intransigent Chinese opposition. On the other hand, the communique registers satisfaction--in a passage attributed only to the Romanian side--over the "recent increasingly manifest tendency" of "certain capitalist countries" to normalize their relations

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

9 JUNE 1971

- 21 -

with the PRC. This passage could be read as encompassing recent Sino-U.S. developments, and at the least its presence in the communique--considering the failure of the Romanians to get in a reference to international communist unity--suggests a degree of Chinese willingness to remain open to further improvements in relations with noncommunist countries.

In welcoming Peking's diplomatic drive, the Romanians took a soft line on central issues bedeviling Sino-U.S. relations, apart from the Indochina conflict.* In the communique the Romanian side calls for the dismantling of U.S. military bases on Taiwan and for the seating of the PRC in the United Nations, but these positions fall well short of Peking's demand for the expulsion of the ROC from the United Nations and for the "liberation" of Taiwan.

* See the Indochina section of this TRENDS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
9 JUNE 1971

- 22 -

NATO MEETING

MOSCOW DEPLORES LACK OF "CONCRETE" REPLY ON FORCE-CUT TALKS

Soviet comment on the 3-4 June meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Lisbon focuses on the alliance's reaction to Brezhnev's 14 May call for the opening of talks on a reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. In characteristic fashion, Moscow says Brezhnev's "initiative" has served to sharpen the differences between the "hawks" in NATO--the United States, Britain, Greece, and Portugal, according to a 3 June domestic broadcast--and the other members "which desire a more constructive attitude toward the Soviet proposal." West Germany is generally cited as a member of the latter group. Thus a TASS dispatch on the 5th, rounding up reaction at the council session to the Brezhnev proposal, said that FRG Foreign Minister Scheel has "described the Soviet proposal . . . as one of the most promising initiatives of this decade." Atypically, a commentary in German by Zakharov on the 7th said that "apart from the FRG, the West European NATO countries have on the whole manifested greater interest in the Soviet proposal than the United States."

Moscow decries what it views as the failure of the session's communique to provide a "concrete" reply to the Brezhnev proposal. For example, a 5 June foreign-language commentary by Soltan--which, like other comment, reiterated the stereotyped line that maintaining tension in Europe is an unchanging objective of NATO--observed that instead of a suitable response the communique "contains sentences on the desire for mutual and balanced disarmament, sentences which have no binding force." Like others, Soltan said that Secretary Rogers was largely responsible for the communique's formulation on the talks on force reductions: Rogers "urged the NATO members not to act hastily" in responding to the Soviet proposal, and it was at Rogers' prodding that the participants in the Lisbon gathering "decided to hold another meeting within the framework of NATO for more discussions [on the Soviet proposal] and to carry out soundings aimed, according to them, at clarifying the Soviet position." Other comment acknowledges that the special meeting on the force-cut proposal will be held between deputy foreign ministers or other high-ranking officials.

The fullest discussion of the communique's formulation on the Brezhnev proposal appeared in the 6 June domestic service commentators' roundtable show. Calling NATO's "three-stage"

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

9 JUNE 1971

- 23 -

approach a product of "militarist circles" in the alliance, one panelist noted that it envisages exploratory talks by individual NATO members with the USSR as a first step; there would then be a special meeting to determine the results of these talks, and finally "a certain as yet unnamed NATO representative would go to Moscow to continue the exploratory talks on behalf of all NATO members." Except in the current comment on the communique, Moscow media continue to avoid discussion of the possible forum in which the force-reduction proposal might be dealt with.

As further evidence of NATO's "anti-detente" posture, commentators cite the communique's formulation on a European security conference. Soltan on the 5th, for example, said that in line with the efforts of NATO leaders to "sabotage" talks on European security problems, the alliance "once again imposed as a precondition for holding the European conference the settling of the West Berlin question." And an article in PRAVDA the following day said that solution of the four-power talks on West Berlin "is again advanced as a prior condition" for the convening of a pan-European conference. Moscow has portrayed the European security conference proposal, like the call for force cuts, as a divisive issue in NATO.

Moscow predictably exploits the holding of the meeting in the capital of Portugal, which continues to "wage disgraceful colonial wars" in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea. And it is critical of the selection of Dutch Foreign Minister Luns as the successor to Manlio Brosio as the next secretary general of the alliance, noting his "pro-Portuguese" stand.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
9 JUNE 1971

- 24 -

OUTER SPACE

USSR SUBMITS DRAFT TREATY ON MOON FOR UNGA CONSIDERATION

TASS on the 8th and PRAVDA on the 9th carry the text of a Soviet draft treaty governing man's activities on the moon and the text of a 4 June covering letter from Gromyko to U Thant asking that the matter be placed on the agenda of the upcoming 26th session of the UN General Assembly. At this writing, followup comment is confined to a TASS-summarized 9 June PRAVDA article hailing the 7 June linkup of the manned Soyuz 11 craft and the unmanned Salyut resulting in a "piloted orbital scientific station." The article says that the submission of the draft treaty reaffirms the USSR's "noble desire . . . to use successes in exploring and utilizing outer space to strengthen the cause of peace, mutual understanding, and cooperation between states."

The Gromyko letter, which spells out the main provisions of the draft treaty, including its call for prohibiting the militarization of the moon and the polluting of the lunar environment, cites as the rationale for the submission of the treaty the extensive moon exploration program conducted by the United States and the USSR. It says that the USSR has always advocated a progressive development of international space law in the interests of all peoples. Both the letter and the treaty recall the previous accords on cosmonaut rescue and on the principles governing the activity of states in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies. Gromyko says that both accords were "initiated" by the USSR. President Johnson had in fact suggested the possibility of a treaty governing the activities of states in the exploration of outer space, in a statement released on 7 May 1966. The statement came more than three weeks before Gromyko on 30 May had sent a letter to U Thant outlining principles on which such an accord might be based. It was not until 16 June 1966 that a Soviet draft treaty was forwarded to U Thant with the request that it be considered in the General Assembly; and TASS on the 17th had reported that the United States had sent its draft treaty to the UNGA Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space with the suggestion that it be considered in the legal subcommittee of that body.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

9 JUNE 1971

- 25 -

While the Gromyko letter requests that the General Assembly this fall give consideration to the draft treaty, it additionally suggests that the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and its legal subcommittee--which will meet before the Assembly session--be advised of the treaty.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI/TRENDS
9 JUNE 1971

- 26 -

MIDDLE EAST

PRIMAKOV COMMENTS HIGHLIGHT 1967 WAR ANNIVERSARY PROPAGANDA

Moscow's low-key treatment of the fourth anniversary of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war is keynoted by a 5 June article by Primakov in PRAVDA and an interview with him broadcast in three installments in the Arabic-language service beginning on the 5th.* And another commentary broadcast in foreign languages is also attributed to Primakov. In both the PRAVDA article and the first installment of the radio interview Primakov focuses on the U.S. role in the Middle East, routinely arguing that the United States seeks to weaken Arab-Soviet ties and to restore American positions in the area. In PRAVDA, he belittles the "American initiative" for a Middle East settlement in standard terms, and claims that Secretary Rogers, in Cairo, produced a U.S.-Israeli model for a settlement which avoided the chief question of withdrawal and separated the canal issue from an overall solution. In the interview he outlines what he calls the stages in imperialist attempts to "overthrow the progressive Arab regimes"--an accusation made repeatedly by propagandists since the 1967 war.

At the same time, Primakov is at pains to show that alleged imperialist efforts to sow dissension between the UAR and the USSR, and Western predictions of a change in Egyptian orientation, have failed. As evidence he holds up, in PRAVDA, the UAR-Soviet friendship and cooperation treaty, and in the interview he singles out "major points" in the communique on Podgorny's recent Cairo visit.

Overall, Primakov's comments would seem to add up to standard criticism of U.S. motives in the Middle East. By injecting some new elements touching on UAR internal affairs--an implicit criticism of AL-AHRAM chief editor Haykal and a remark on the UAR leadership succession--he is perhaps also making a veiled

* Propaganda on the Middle East for the week ending 6 June accounts for three percent of Moscow's total broadcast comment, the same figure as for the second anniversary (2-8 June 1969). Last year the figure was four percent, with one percent devoted to the USSR's "week of solidarity with the Arab people," which receives only nominal attention this year.

CONFIDENTIAL

9 JUNE 1971

- 27 -

admission that the recent Egyptian changes were not altogether satisfactory from the Soviet point of view. While observations on the UAR leadership question are unusual in Soviet propaganda, it may only be that Primakov, in carrying out his anniversary observance assignments, is exercising the latitude he and Belyayev have previously shown on occasion to be somewhat more forthcoming than their colleagues.*

EVENTS In his PRAVDA article, Primakov leads into his implicit
IN UAR reference to Haykal by charging that Secretary Rogers' Middle East mission was aimed largely at the activation of "pro-American feelings still prevalent to some extent" in a number of Arab countries. He notes that "on the eve" of the trip "certain Arab journalists" wrote that the key to a solution of the Middle East problem lies in the hands of the United States, a thesis which he says caused great indignation in the UAR. He derides what he calls a subsequent "more flexible" thesis on "neutralization" of the United States--a thesis which Haykal had advocated in his weekly AL-AHRAM article on 4 March. At the time, Moscow did not directly acknowledge Haykal's views or his resulting dispute with AL-JUMHURIYAH. Propaganda then addressed the issue obliquely, Arabic-language broadcasts arguing--as Primakov does now--that the United States is not the key to a Middle East settlement, and Soviet media publicizing AL-JUMHURIYAH comment defending Arab-Soviet relations.**

Primakov's motivation in surfacing the argument now is unclear, nor is it clear to whom his remarks are addressed; the PRAVDA article is summarized in a broadcast in English to North America and in other foreign languages, but not in Arabic. (Haykal is quoted in NEW TIMES No. 22 as praising Soviet military assistance and Arab-Soviet friendship in a 21 May article; NEW TIMES also cites a tribute to Soviet-Egyptian relations in a 24 May AL-AHRAM editorial--which also pointedly observed that the USSR "does not interfere in Egypt's domestic affairs.")

* A Primakov radio interview was broadcast in installments in Arabic early in May, just prior to Secretary Rogers' arrival in Cairo. Primakov, who along with Belyayev was one of PRAVDA's chief Middle East commentators, does not contribute frequently on Middle East developments now that he is deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of World Economic and International Relations. Belyayev now holds the same position with the Academy's Africa Institute.

** See the TRENDS for 17 March, pages 21-22, and for 24 March, pages 27-28.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
9 JUNE 1971

- 28 -

Another intriguing remark by Primakov comes in the Arabic-language interview--but not in PRAVDA--in connection with the UAR leadership question. As if concerned to stress that Egyptian domestic policies will continue unchanged, Primakov emphasizes that the recent communique referred to as-Sadat's statement of intention to continue Nasir's line "on the domestic level, too." (And in PRAVDA he takes pains to point out that the recent party-government changes were of a "purely domestic nature," unconnected with any problem of UAR "orientation." This is contrary, he says, to Western press "misrepresentation" of the events as a clash between pro-Soviet and pro-Western forces.)

But an earlier passage, on the succession after Nasir's death, could be read as an endorsement of collective leadership. Thus Primakov claims that after Nasir's death an attempt was made by "quarters close to, or closer to, the West" to exploit his death in order to seize power. This attempt failed, he says, with the succession of President as-Sadat and "other independent personalities who had connections" with Nasir and "can very rightly be called the companions of Nasir," and who declared that they would continue to pursue his policies.

Soviet propaganda in the wake of Nasir's death had largely abstained from speculation on the succession, although PRAVDA on 6 October had some cautionary remarks about "certain people in the West" entertaining hopes of reactivating in the UAR "those long since dead as far as politics are concerned" and of reversing the UAR development.

What may be another oblique reference to the UAR changes came in a Kudryavtsev IZVESTIYA article on 3 June. Remarking that President Nixon's foreign policy message in February "talks a lot about the 'rivalry of the great powers,'" Kudryavtsev declared that the United States sees the Arab countries not as independent sovereign states but as the object of this rivalry. This, he said, explains American propaganda about "pro-Soviet" and "pro-American" governments in the Arab countries. He added that many events in the Middle East countries "are often determined by intrapolitical considerations and not by the interests of other powers."

POLITICAL SETTLEMENT In the third and final installment of his interview, broadcast on the 8th, Primakov outlines the stereotyped Soviet "understanding" of a political settlement in the Middle East. He notes that the Western press claims the UAR-Soviet treaty obstructs the realization of a political solution. If such a solution is defined as one favoring Israel,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

9 JUNE 1971

- 29 -

he adds, then the treaty does constitute an obstacle, but it does not if one accepts the Soviet definition of a political solution. This is based first, he says, on Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories, and he adds that "we shall not fall into the trap" of Israeli propaganda arguments that a threat to Israel will be created by its withdrawal. National security in this era, he argues, is not defined by moving borders 10, 20, or 30 miles, but by the general situation. His second point is "strengthening the defensive power" of the Arab countries to prevent Israel from "realizing its schemes." Third, he says, the Palestinians must be given their "legitimate rights"--the standard, imprecise phrase which Primakov does not further define. Israel, he says, was created as a result of self-determination of the Jewish people, and he asks how the right to self-determination can be denied another people.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
9 JUNE 1971

- 30 -

USSR AND YUGOSLAVIA

BELGRADE PROTESTS "SLANDERS" BY EMIGRES IN SOVIET UNION

A lengthy dispatch from Belgrade POLITIKA's correspondent in Moscow, as reported by TANJUG on 9 June, charges that Yugoslav emigres are giving lectures in the Soviet Union "slandering LCY policy and President Tito." TANJUG added that the Yugoslav Secretariat of Foreign Affairs has lodged a "resolute protest" against this activity with the USSR Ambassador in Belgrade.

POLITIKA's correspondent says he has learned from Soviet citizens of various professions that Yugoslavia is "a frequent subject of many lectures by Moscow political informants." He adds that the lectures serve as a special means of "informing Soviet citizens about subjects which otherwise cannot be found in public media." The message of these lectures, the report said, is that the LCY program has broken down, that the economy is in chaos, and that the only way out of the crisis is "to abandon self-management socialism and to return to the system of firm party and administrative control."

Citing specifics, the correspondent reports that one Yugoslav emigre, identified in a poster as "the well-known Yugoslav partisan and Lieutenant Colonel of the Soviet Army Blazo Raspopovic," recently told a group of Moscow students that Yugoslavia "has deviated from the road of constructing socialism and has isolated itself from the world communist movement." The lecturer described Tito, the dispatch said, as "an anonymous person" until 1943 who managed to seize power by "various machinations." The correspondent also reported that a "Cominform emigre" named Jovo Elez had delivered a "slanderous" lecture on the Yugoslav nationality problem in "the very center of Moscow, the hall of the Polytechnical Museum."

Moscow had cautiously refrained from direct attempts to exploit the present situation in Yugoslavia in its official media. The Soviet press has on occasion published speeches and reports from Yugoslav sources dwelling on the country's economic and political woes, but the POLITIKA report constitutes the first public evidence that Moscow may be trying

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS

9 JUNE 1971

- 31 -

to exploit the present situation unofficially--perhaps for its own domestic purposes as well as in preparation for the post-Tito period, when it may be expected to make a similar appeal to any remaining Yugoslav hardliners.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
9 JUNE 1971

- 32 -

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

PRAGUE REACTS BELATEDLY TO WEST GERMAN STORY ON HUSAK

Prague waited until a week after the close of the 14th CPCZ Congress to react belatedly, in a domestic service commentary on 5 June, to the Hamburg DER SPIEGEL's publication on 17 May of purported excerpts from a letter to Gustav Husak from an unidentified Czechoslovak security officer warning the CPCZ leader of a plot against him by ultraconservative, Soviet-controlled elements in the CSSR security service. The plotters, according to the alleged letter, intended to oust and arrest Husak as they had Dubcek. Prague dismissed it as malicious anticommunist propaganda.

DER SPIEGEL's excerpts sought to embarrass the CPCZ leader with statements portraying him, for example, as opposed both to Dubcek's attempts to "weaken" socialism and to the August invasion: "Just like yourself, Comrade Husak, I have been convinced to this day that we were fully capable of fending off such attempts. For me, too, August 1968 was a shock." The letter named, among others, security service staff member Bohumil Molnar who, it said, organized the arrest of Dubcek. It added: "Perhaps he will also deem it advantageous some day to arrest Comrade Husak, for example, or to testify against him." If Husak tried to move against such people the letter warned, he would be prevented from doing so by "the Soviet friends and their subordinates in the party apparatus," such as Premier Strougal and "Otakar Svercina, an old agent of the security service."

The responsive Prague commentary was attributed to Svercina, now Director General of the news agency CTK. Keyed to the party's successes and the people's confidence in party policies in the wake of the 14th congress, the commentary remarked that "even such an anticommunist periodical as the Hamburg SPIEGEL could think of nothing better before the congress than to publish some kind of anonymous letter warning Comrade Husak of dangerous people in the party." It polemicized further: "How poor, how deplorable, how naive are all these products of the anti-Soviet and anti-Czechoslovak campaign which is waged most ferociously on the territory of our West German neighbor!"

CONFIDENTIAL

- 33 -

Svercina wound up his remarks on the letter by declaring that the "unity" demonstrated at the Czechoslovak congress "will foil every disturbing attempt of the opportunists of all shades and kinds, irrespective of whether they appear abroad or whisper maliciously at home."

HUSAK'S STATUS Husak's stock with the Soviets appears to be at its highest point so far. The Soviet leaders' 13 May message on the 50th anniversary of the CPCZ and the speeches by Brezhnev and the other Warsaw Five leaders at the 25-29 May CPCZ congress went further than before in crediting Husak with having achieved "normalization" of the country. And PRAVDA on 26 May, in a two-page TASS summary of Husak's congress report, departed from Soviet media's past practice by including this time a considerable portion of Husak's customary indictment of the leadership of the conservative Antonin Novotny.* Moscow's accounts of his earlier speeches had focused on his denunciations of Dubcek.

Soviet comment since the close of the CPCZ congress, however, has been laudatory of the CPCZ leader but not effusive: Editorials on the congress in PRAVDA on 31 May and in IZVESTIYA on 1 June each contain only one mention of Husak. The Soviet treatment would be compatible with conjectures that Husak may eventually replace the aging Svoboda as President and be replaced as CPCZ leader by an ultraconservative such as Bilak or Indra.

While Soviet media have not given undue prominence to the conservative spokesmen, the issue of KOMMUNIST (No. 8) signed to the press on 25 May marks the CPCZ's 50th anniversary with an article by Bilak, whose strong position has recently been pointed up by the Czechoslovaks themselves. He was lavishly praised by both Lenart and Husak at the mid-May Slovak party congress, Husak dismissing reports of differences between himself and Bilak and terming Bilak one of his closest coworkers. At the CPCZ congress, Bilak was given the honor of welcoming the foreign delegations by name in a speech just prior to Husak's delivery of the Central Committee report to the congress. TASS carried brief summaries of Bilak's welcoming remarks and his main congress speech of the 27th, generally the same treatment Soviet media gave all the congress speeches other than Brezhnev's and Husak's.

* Czechoslovak media have not so far reacted to a Prague-dated REUTER report of 3 June that Novotny, "suspended" from the CPCZ since May 1968, has been restored to party membership.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
9 JUNE 1971

- 34 -

PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

KANG, HSIEH REAPPEAR AS CHEN PO-TA ABSENCE CONTINUES

The visit of Romanian leader Ceausescu has had the side effect of returning missing PRC leaders Hsieh Fu-chih and Kang Sheng to the public scene. Hsieh, missing since March 1970 though named first secretary of the Peking Municipal Committee in March of this year, was honored by a separate NCNA account of his visit with the Romanian leaders on 3 June. Kang had surfaced earlier on the same day at Mao's reception for the Romanian delegation; NCNA ranked him after Chou En-lai in a listing of the PRC leaders present, indicating that he retains his post as member of the Politburo Standing Committee.

Neither Kang nor Hsieh was listed among those participating in the formal talks between the two sides, however, and the extent to which they have returned to active duty is still unclear. Kang's long-held responsibilities in the sphere of interparty relations should have dictated his participation in the talks. And it was Peking Municipal Committee Second Secretary Wu Te rather than Hsieh, nominally first secretary, who opened a Peking rally for the Romanians on 8 June in behalf of the committee.

The reappearance of both Kang and Hsieh further underscores the continued absence of Politburo Standing Committee member Chen Po-ta, now unmentioned in PRC media for nearly a year and the apparent target of a campaign against "idealist apriorism." Chen's real error seems to have been "ultra-leftism" in the cultural revolution rather than the philosophical crimes under attack in this campaign. A charge against Chen--like Liu Shao-chi and others indicted during the cultural revolution--for betraying the revolution when he was captured by the Kuomintang may have been implicit in a 10 May KWANGMING DAILY article which recalled that Liu "and his followers" betrayed the workers' armed forces in the Wuhan area. Relatively little is known of Chen during the early 1930's, but he did engage in propaganda work in North China, Liu's bailiwick. According to the BOLSHAYA SOVETSKAYA ENTSIKLOPEDIYA (Vol. 47, April 1957), Chen was imprisoned by the Kuomintang in 1931-32.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

9 JUNE 1971

- 35 -

PROVINCIAL PARTY COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED IN YUNNAN

Creation of a party committee for Yunnan was announced by NCNA on 9 June, nine days after an ebullient report by Kunming radio on lower-level party building successes in the province. Of the PRC's 29 administrative districts, only Szechwan, Tibet, Ningsia, and Heilungkiang now remain without new party committees.

The leadership opening created by the death of chairman Tan Fu-jen last December has been filled by Chou Hsing, former governor and a secretary on the old Yunnan party committee, who was named first secretary of the new one. Chou has been a revolutionary committee vice-chairman since 1968 and first political commissar of the Yunnan Military District since before the cultural revolution.

Military men won the remaining three leadership positions on the new committee. Wang Pi-cheng, who was named second secretary, has held his concurrent position of first deputy commander of the Kunming Military Region (MR) since May 1970. The two secretaries of the new committee, Chen Kang and Lu Jui-lin, are both vice-chairmen and military commanders with several years' experience within the Yunnan power structure. Chen has been commander of the Kunming Garrison since 1963; Lu has held his concurrent position of deputy commander of the Kunming MR since 1958.

Consisting of 89 full and 15 alternate members, the new committee was selected by 1,235 party delegates meeting in Kunming from 31 May to 3 June. Chou's routine speech to the congress, made on behalf of the party nucleus group of the revolutionary committee, stressed themes contained in the keynote addresses of heads of new committees in the other border provinces: calling for improvement of "the building of border defense politically," Chou declared that Yunnan would "support by concrete action the Indochinese peoples in their struggle against U.S. aggression."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
9 JUNE 1971

- 36 -

MINISTRY ARTICLE INDICATES NEW STRESS ON LIGHT INDUSTRY

An article by the writing group of the Ministry of Light Industry broadcast by the Peking radio on 29 May seems to presage increased attention to the consumer-goods sector of the economy in the new five-year plan, whose details have yet to be released. Whether the article accurately reflects decisions taken by the current top leadership or constitutes lobbying to influence discussions still underway, its appearance in the public media points at least toward the presence of appreciable support within the leadership for greater efforts in the consumer sector.

The article concentrates on the need to reduce the reliance of light industry on agricultural products. While it envisages that agricultural inputs to light industry will continue to furnish the major share of raw materials for many years, it registers an awareness that the industry cannot have a reliable materials base so long as it is heavily dependent on the vagaries of agricultural production. Since the article makes it clear that state policy does not permit reliance on imports, its implicit conclusion is that industrial raw materials production should now be encouraged. The new line set forth in the article is to "firmly grasp industrial raw materials while paying attention to properly grasping agricultural raw materials, gradually raise the proportion of industrial raw materials in the entire raw material structure of light industry."

The extent of the stress on light, consumer-oriented industry that is advocated in the article is apparent in the remark that although light industry must "give play to the spirit of self-reliance" in producing industrial raw materials, the development of such materials "requires the active cooperation of heavy industry." The article does not appear to suggest a light industry line that would affect the basic PRC policy--forcefully reiterated this spring--which views iron and steel production as the key to industrial success. But it does appear to call for greater use of these resources for the manufacture equipment that could be used to produce such industrial raw materials as artificial fibers and plastics.